When a cyclist sees the Trek Madone SLR 9 Gen 8 AXS for the first time, the following thoughts run through their head, usually in this order:

"What a beautiful bike."

"Damn, that looks really fast."

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When a cyclist sees the Trek Madone SLR 9 Gen 8 AXS for the first time, the following thoughts run through their head, usually in this order:

"What a beautiful bike."

"Damn, that looks really fast."

Read full article

Comments

When a cyclist sees the Trek Madone SLR 9 Gen 8 AXS for the first time, the following thoughts run through their head, usually in this order:

"What a beautiful bike."

"Damn, that looks really fast."

Read full article

Comments

Google is hosting dozens of extensions in its Chrome Web Store that perform suspicious actions on the more than 4 million devices that have installed it and that the developer has taken pains to carefully conceal.

The extensions, which so far number at least 35, use the same code patterns, connect to some of the same servers, and require the same list of sensitive systems permissions, including the ability to interact with web traffic on all URLs visited, access cookies, manage browser tabs, and execute scripts. In more detail, the permissions are:

• Tabs: manage and interact with browser windows
• Cookies: set and access stored browser cookies based on cookie or domain names (ex., "Authorization" or "all cookies for GitHub.com")
• WebRequest: intercept and modify web requests the browser makes
• Storage: ability to store small amounts of information persistently in the browser (these extensions store their command & control configuration here)
• Scripting: the ability to inject new JavaScript into web pages and manipulate the DOM
• Alarms: an internal messaging service to trigger events. The extension uses this to trigger events like a cron job as it can allow for scheduling the heartbeat callbacks by the extension
• <all_urls>: This works in tandem with other permissions like webRequest, but allows for the extension to be functionally interact all browsing activity (completely unnecessary for an extension that should just look at your installed extensions

These sorts of permissions give extensions the ability to do all sorts of potentially abusive things and, as such, should be judiciously granted only to trusted extensions that can’t perform core functions without them.

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Google is hosting dozens of extensions in its Chrome Web Store that perform suspicious actions on the more than 4 million devices that have installed it and that the developer has taken pains to carefully conceal.

The extensions, which so far number at least 35, use the same code patterns, connect to some of the same servers, and require the same list of sensitive systems permissions, including the ability to interact with web traffic on all URLs visited, access cookies, manage browser tabs, and execute scripts. In more detail, the permissions are:

• Tabs: manage and interact with browser windows
• Cookies: set and access stored browser cookies based on cookie or domain names (ex., "Authorization" or "all cookies for GitHub.com")
• WebRequest: intercept and modify web requests the browser makes
• Storage: ability to store small amounts of information persistently in the browser (these extensions store their command & control configuration here)
• Scripting: the ability to inject new JavaScript into web pages and manipulate the DOM
• Alarms: an internal messaging service to trigger events. The extension uses this to trigger events like a cron job as it can allow for scheduling the heartbeat callbacks by the extension
• <all_urls>: This works in tandem with other permissions like webRequest, but allows for the extension to be functionally interact all browsing activity (completely unnecessary for an extension that should just look at your installed extensions

These sorts of permissions give extensions the ability to do all sorts of potentially abusive things and, as such, should be judiciously granted only to trusted extensions that can’t perform core functions without them.

Read full article

Comments

Google is hosting dozens of extensions in its Chrome Web Store that perform suspicious actions on the more than 4 million devices that have installed it and that the developer has taken pains to carefully conceal.

The extensions, which so far number at least 35, use the same code patterns, connect to some of the same servers, and require the same list of sensitive systems permissions, including the ability to interact with web traffic on all URLs visited, access cookies, manage browser tabs, and execute scripts. In more detail, the permissions are:

• Tabs: manage and interact with browser windows
• Cookies: set and access stored browser cookies based on cookie or domain names (ex., "Authorization" or "all cookies for GitHub.com")
• WebRequest: intercept and modify web requests the browser makes
• Storage: ability to store small amounts of information persistently in the browser (these extensions store their command & control configuration here)
• Scripting: the ability to inject new JavaScript into web pages and manipulate the DOM
• Alarms: an internal messaging service to trigger events. The extension uses this to trigger events like a cron job as it can allow for scheduling the heartbeat callbacks by the extension
• <all_urls>: This works in tandem with other permissions like webRequest, but allows for the extension to be functionally interact all browsing activity (completely unnecessary for an extension that should just look at your installed extensions

These sorts of permissions give extensions the ability to do all sorts of potentially abusive things and, as such, should be judiciously granted only to trusted extensions that can’t perform core functions without them.

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I recently wrote a story about the wild ride of the Starliner spacecraft to the International Space Station last summer. It was based largely on an interview with the commander of the mission, NASA astronaut Butch Wilmore.

His account of Starliner’s thruster failures—and his desperate efforts to keep the vehicle flying on course—was riveting. In the aftermath of the story, many readers, people on social media, and real-life friends congratulated me on conducting a great interview. But truth be told, it was pretty much all Wilmore.

Essentially, when I came into the room, he was primed to talk. I'm not sure if Wilmore was waiting for me specifically to talk to, but he pretty clearly wanted to speak with someone about his experiences aboard the Starliner spacecraft. And he chose me.

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I recently wrote a story about the wild ride of the Starliner spacecraft to the International Space Station last summer. It was based largely on an interview with the commander of the mission, NASA astronaut Butch Wilmore.

His account of Starliner’s thruster failures—and his desperate efforts to keep the vehicle flying on course—was riveting. In the aftermath of the story, many readers, people on social media, and real-life friends congratulated me on conducting a great interview. But truth be told, it was pretty much all Wilmore.

Essentially, when I came into the room, he was primed to talk. I'm not sure if Wilmore was waiting for me specifically to talk to, but he pretty clearly wanted to speak with someone about his experiences aboard the Starliner spacecraft. And he chose me.

Read full article

Comments

I recently wrote a story about the wild ride of the Starliner spacecraft to the International Space Station last summer. It was based largely on an interview with the commander of the mission, NASA astronaut Butch Wilmore.

His account of Starliner’s thruster failures—and his desperate efforts to keep the vehicle flying on course—was riveting. In the aftermath of the story, many readers, people on social media, and real-life friends congratulated me on conducting a great interview. But truth be told, it was pretty much all Wilmore.

Essentially, when I came into the room, he was primed to talk. I'm not sure if Wilmore was waiting for me specifically to talk to, but he pretty clearly wanted to speak with someone about his experiences aboard the Starliner spacecraft. And he chose me.

Read full article

Comments